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Authentication levels

The ACR / AAL assurance model and the mapping of each authentication factor to its assurance level.

When a user signs in, the platform records how strongly their identity was proven and expresses it as an assurance level. Policies and applications can then require a minimum level before granting access. This page explains the two terms you will see — AAL and ACR — and how individual factors map onto them.

AAL — Authenticator Assurance Level

AAL is the strength of the authentication, following the NIST SP 800-63B model. The platform offers seven assurance levels in the policy picker, from an email-only sign-in up to hardware-protected multi-factor:

LevelACR valueMeaningTypical use
AAL0 (passwordless email)urn:nist:800-63:aal0A single weak possession factor: a one-time code or sign-in link sent to the user's verified email address. The lowest level in the model and below AAL1: a mailbox is not an accepted authenticator under NIST SP 800-63B, so no NIST assurance level is claimed.A consumer sign-in in a directory using email code login, where convenience outweighs assurance.
AAL1urn:nist:800-63:aal1A single full first factor: a password, or a login through an external identity provider. Some assurance, but vulnerable to phishing and guessing. Requiring this level asks for a password specifically — a second factor cannot stand in for one, so a user signed in with an email code is asked for their password.Sign-in where a real credential is required, while weaker methods are not enough.
AAL1+ (enhanced)urn:nist:800-63:aal1:mfaA single factor strengthened by a weak second channel. Slightly stronger than AAL1, but not true MFA.Password plus an email one-time code.
AAL2 (conditional)urn:nist:800-63:aal2:ifenrolledMulti-factor only if the user has a factor enrolled. Otherwise no second factor is asked for, and the sign-in keeps the level of its first factor — AAL1 for a password, AAL0 for an email code. The default for normal application sign-in.Password plus a second factor when one exists; password, or an email code, alone while none is enrolled yet.
AAL2urn:nist:800-63:aal2Multi-factor: a password plus a possession factor, always required. Phishing-resistant when a cryptographic factor is used.Password plus TOTP, SMS, or a security key / passkey.
AAL2+ (phishing-resistant)urn:nist:800-63:aal2:phrMulti-factor where the possession factor cryptographically verifies the sign-in origin, with user verification. Currently satisfied only by FIDO2 / WebAuthn.A passkey with biometric or PIN verification.
AAL3urn:nist:800-63:aal3Phishing-resistant, hardware-protected authentication: a hardware-bound key whose private key cannot be exported, with user verification.A hardware security key whose make and model is attestation-verified.

AAL0 never satisfies a higher requirement. An application or policy asking for AAL1 or above is not met by an email-only sign-in, so the user is challenged for another factor, and because a password is not in play, only a passkey can close that gap. The Admin Console requires multi-factor authentication and is therefore never reachable at AAL0.

The AAL2 (conditional) level lets you raise everyone toward MFA without locking out users who have not yet enrolled a factor: the second factor is demanded only when the user has one, otherwise the login settles at AAL1.

Note: The level a session reaches is decided by the combination of factors used, not merely by how many categories they fall into. A factor combination only reaches a level if it matches one of that level's accepted combinations.

ACR — Authentication Context Class Reference

ACR is the value the platform uses to name an assurance level in policies and tokens. Where AAL is the concept, ACR is the identifier that travels with a request or a session:

  • An authentication policy or an application can request a minimum ACR. If the user's current session does not meet it, the platform prompts for a stronger or additional factor (step-up).
  • After authentication, the platform resolves the highest ACR the session's factors satisfy and records it. OIDC tokens carry this value so downstream applications can make their own decisions.
  • A SAML application can request a specific assurance through the AuthnContext in its request; the platform maps this to the same model.
  • A relying application or API can request a specific assurance per request, not only as a fixed per-app default — so a sensitive operation (a payment, an admin action) can demand step-up at the moment it happens. If the active session already meets the requested level, no extra prompt appears; if it does not, the user is challenged for the missing factor before a token is issued at that level.
  • A level requested by an application can only raise the requirement, never lower it. The configured requirement (the tenant-wide MFA setting under Security, or a matching authentication policy) is the lower bound: if an application asks for a weaker level than that, the configured requirement still applies and the user is challenged as usual. The one exception is an authentication policy, which is set by an administrator and therefore authoritative: its level replaces the tenant-wide default and may also be lower, for example to exempt a low-risk application from MFA.

The ACR values follow the NIST SP 800-63B naming convention — urn:nist:800-63:aal1, :aal2, and :aal3, with a colon-qualifier (:pwd, :mfa, :ifenrolled, :phr) for the finer tiers; the ACR value column above lists the exact string for each level. An OIDC application requests a minimum level through the standard acr_values request parameter — or a fixed per-application default — and the platform issues the token at the highest level the session actually satisfies. (SAML applications express assurance through the SAML AuthnContext, using the standard SAML class references rather than these values.)

An ACR configured in an authentication policy or on an application that the platform does not recognize is treated as unsatisfiable: it fails closed rather than being silently allowed through. An unrecognized value in the acr_values request parameter is ignored instead, and the configured requirement applies unchanged, so a malformed request cannot lock a user out of a working application.

Factor-to-assurance mapping

The following table summarizes which assurance level each factor contributes to. Most second factors reach AAL2 when combined with a password; the phishing-resistant and hardware levels depend on the kind of WebAuthn credential used. Note that the email channel appears twice: once as the sole factor of a passwordless sign-in (AAL0) and once as a second factor backing a password (AAL1+).

FactorOn its ownCombined with a passwordNotes
PasswordAAL1—Knowledge factor; the usual first step.
External IdP / social loginAAL1—Treated as a single-factor sign-in.
Email one-time code / sign-in link (as the only factor)AAL0—Available only in a directory with email code login enabled. Below AAL1; no NIST assurance level is claimed.
Email one-time code (as a second factor)—AAL1+ (enhanced)A weak possession channel; never reaches AAL2 (email is not an accepted out-of-band authenticator). Available only when a policy explicitly requires the enhanced level. Email never counts as the second factor of a sign-in that started with an email code.
TOTP (authenticator app)—AAL2Standard second factor.
SMS one-time code—AAL2Standard second factor.
Passkey / platform authenticator (software-secured)AAL2+ with user verificationAAL2+Phishing-resistant; synced or platform passkeys (e.g. Touch ID, iCloud Keychain) count as software-secured, capping at AAL2+.
Security key — make/model unverifiedAAL2+ with user verificationAAL2+Caps at AAL2+ until the model's hardware protection is attestation-verified.
Security key — hardware-attestedAAL3 with user verificationAAL3The only factor reaching AAL3: a non-exportable hardware key, verified against published authenticator metadata, used in a phishing-resistant protocol.
Recovery code——A last-resort fallback, not an assurance-raising factor.

The distinction between a software-secured passkey (AAL2+) and a hardware-attested security key (AAL3) is established at enrollment and stored with the credential — it is never re-derived at sign-in. A credential enrolled as unverified stays unverified until it is re-enrolled. See Multi-factor authentication for how factors are enabled and enrolled.

Because of this, a security key that was enrolled before its hardware protection could be attested cannot satisfy an AAL3 requirement. Where AAL3 is required, such a key is not offered as a verification option, and the user is shown a message explaining that the key does not meet the requirement, rather than being asked to verify a key that can never complete the sign-in. The fix is to enroll the security key again under Multi-factor authentication in the user's account, which re-runs attestation and stores the result with the credential.

Where assurance levels are used

  • Authentication policies — require a minimum ACR under given conditions (directory, group, specific users, network zone, time window), driving step-up. See Authentication policies.
  • Per-application requirements — an individual application can demand a higher assurance than the default, for example requiring phishing-resistant MFA for an administrative tool.
  • SAML AuthnContext — a SAML application requests an assurance class in its authentication request, which the platform honors and reflects in the assertion.
  • Admin Console sign-in — administrative access is held to a multi-factor requirement independent of end-user application policies.

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